

## Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USBERLIN 2075

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR,PINT, EAIR, WB, GW, GE, UR

SUBJECT: HILLENBRAND-YEFREMOV LUNCHEON, NOVEMBER 11

1. SUMMARY: AT LUNCH HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND NOVEMBER 11, SOVIET AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV, APPARENTLY WITH AN EYE TO THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT, AVOIDED CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. HIS REMARKS WERE LARGEMLY LIMITED TO A REHEARSAL OF SOVIET POSITIONS ON LUFTHANSA LANDINGS IN WEST BERLIN (THIS WAS A MATTER FOR FRG-GDR DISCUSSION); THE NPD (THE SOVIETS APPROVED THE ALLIED BAN ON BERLIN ACTIVITY); TRANSIT ROUTE DISTURBANCES (THERE WERE NONE--THIS WAS JUST WEST GERMAN EXAGGERATION); AND FRG-WEST BERLIN TIES. DESPITE ADVANCE WORD THAT YEFREMOV WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN BERLIN, THE SUBJECT WAS NOT RAISED. THE AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT ON THE WHOLE THE QA WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED SATISFACTORILY, AND

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AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND ASSURED YEFREMOV THAT HE SAW NO

INDICATION THAT THE FRG INTENDED TO ASSIMILATE WEST BERLIN. THE ONLY NEW TOPIC WAS AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV'S PROPOSAL, WHICH AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND MERELY AGREED TO TAKE UNDER ADVISEMENT, FOR AN ELABORATE ALLIED-SOVIET CELEBRATION OF THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEFEAT OF NAZI GERMANY. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND HOSTED LUNCH AT HIS RESIDENCE FOR AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV ON NOVEMBER 11. DURING LUNCH, AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV SAID HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT RESURGENT FASCISM AND THE SOVIET UNION APPROVED THE ALLIED ACTION TO CHECK THE NPD IN WEST BERLIN. IN ORDER FURTHER TO DEMONSTRATE FOUR POWER ATTITUDES, HE PROPOSED THAT THE FOUR VICTORIOUS WORLD WAR II POWERS SHOULD ARRANGE A JOINT CELEBRATION NEXT YEAR OF THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEFEAT OF NAZI GERMANY. YEFREMOV WAXED ELOQUENT AS HE PAINTED A PICTURE OF PARTICIPATION BY VETERANS GROUPS AND ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES IN CEREMONIES IN BERLIN AS WELL AS ON THE ELBE RIVER AT TORGAU WHERE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST MET IN 1945. HE SUGGESTED THAT STAFF WORK COULD BE INITIATED RIGHT AWAY. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE SENTIMENTS BEHIND HIS COLLEAGUE'S PROPOSAL, BUT POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ASYMMETRY RESULTING FROM THE PRESENCE OF "ADDITIONAL MILITARY FORCES" IN EAST BERLIN AND THAT ANY CELEBRATIONS HERE SHOULD NOT OUTDISTANCE THOSE ARRANGED BY OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED, HOWEVER, TO TAKE YEFREMOV'S PROPOSAL UNDER ADVISEMENT AND AT LEAST BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF HIS BRITISH AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES.

3. OPENING THE POST-LUNCHEON CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID HE HAD NO MAJOR PROBLEMS TO RAISE WITH HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUE AT THIS TIME. HE WISHED, HOWEVER, TO LET HIM KNOW THAT THE UNUSUAL HEAVY POLICE ACTIVITY IN THE CITY WAS, OF COURSE, A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ASSASSINATION THE PREVIOUS EVENING OF KAMMERGERICHT PRESIDENT VON DRENKMANN. AMBASSADOR CONFIDENTIAL

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HILLENBRAND SAID THAT THERE WAS A SLIGHT POSSIBILITY THAT THE PERPETRATORS HAD ESCAPED INTO THE GDR, BUT HE WAS SURE THAT THESE WERE NOT THE KIND OF PEOPLE THE GDR WOULD WANT TO HAVE AROUND.

4. AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV SAID THAT HE ALSO HAD NO URGENT PROBLEMS TO RAISE. HE WISHED, HOWEVER, TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN WHAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD

AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND CONCERNING LUFTHANSA LANDINGS  
IN WEST BERLIN ON FLIGHTS TO AND FROM MOSCOW. THE  
SOVIET UNION WAS IN NO POSITION TO GRANT PERMISSION  
FOR THESE FLIGHTS AND THE MATTER WAS ONE FOR THE FRG  
TO DISCUSS WITH THE GDR. THE GDR, YEFREMOV ADDED,  
WAS CLEARLY NOT INTERESTED IN SEEING LUFTHANSA LAND  
IN WEST BERLIN.

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5. AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV SAID HE FELT THE QA WAS BEING  
IMPLEMENTED SATISFACTORILY. THERE WERE A FEW POINTS  
ON WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO SEE IMPROVEMENTS,  
BUT THESE WERE BEST LEFT TO DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE  
SOVIET AND ALLIED POLITICAL COUNSELLORS. REFERRING  
TO HIS EARLIER REMARKS, AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV SAID THAT  
THE SOVIET UNION WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE THREAT  
TO WORLD PEACE REPRESENTED BY NEO-FASCIST AND  
REVANCHIST ELEMENTS, AND WAS CONSEQUENTLY VERY ALERT TO  
SIGNS OF ANY SUCH ELEMENTS APPEARING IN WEST BERLIN.  
THE ALLIED DECISION TO BAN NPD PARTICIPATION IN THE

MARCH 1975 BERLIN ELECTIONS AND TO PROHIBIT THE PARTY FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES FOR THE DURATION OF THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN WAS CORRECT AND HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE SOVIETS. (FIRST SECRETARY BURDAKIN HAD REMARKED TO A MISSION OFFICER THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ALLIES SIMILARLY BAN ACTIVITY OF THE BUNDES FREIES DEUTSCHLAND (USBERLIN 1996,

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ET AL), BUT YEFREMOV DID NOT PURSUE THIS SUGGESTION.) THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO OBSERVING VERY CLOSELY THE FRG'S EFFORTS TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE OVER WEST BERLIN. AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV CITED THE POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "BIOLOGICAL INSTITUTE" (POSSIBLY A REFERENCE TO PLANS TO ESTABLISH A PHARMACEUTICAL STANDARDS ORGANIZATION USING PERSONNEL ALREADY IN THE BERLIN OFFICES OF THE FRG MINISTRY OF HEALTH), AND THE EXTENSION TO BERLIN OF THE AMENDEMNT TO THE LAW ON INNER-GERMAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, AND SAID THAT SUCH EFFORTS IRRITATED THE SOVIET UNION AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED FOR THE GOOD OF ALL CONCERNED. YEFREMOV NOTED THAT AGITATION FOR A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRG WAS ALSO COMING FROM WITHIN WEST BERLIN. WHILE HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE COURSE OF AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN EACH AND EVERY POLITICIAN SOUGHT TO OUTDO HIS COMPETITORS, HE COULD NOT HELP BUT NOTICE THAT BEHIND THE ELECTORAL STRUGGLE LAY ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE QA. YEFREMOV PERSONALLY REQUESTED AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW FEDERAL AGENCIES IN WEST BERLIN. IT WAS NOT THE SOVIET INTENT TO REMOVE THE EXISTING TIES BETWEEN THE FRG AND WEST BERLIN, WHICH WERE FULLY ACCEPTABLE. BUT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT AGREE WITH AND COULD NOT TOLERATE ATTEMPTS BY THE FRG TO GOVERN WEST BERLIN.

6. AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV REJECTED ACCUSATIONS THAT THE GDR WAS GUILTY OF BREAKING THE FRG-GDR TRANSIT AGREEMENT. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN ASTONISHED WHEN HIS STAFF HAD INFORMED HIM SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE THAT AS MANY AS 10 MILLION VEHICLES AND 29 MILLION PASSENGERS HAD USED THE TRANSIT ROUTES BETWEEN THE FRG AND BERLIN SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE QA. THIS WAS AN IMPRESSIVE VOLUME OF TRAFFIC, AND THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN PHYSICALLY ACCOMMODATED SHOWED THAT THE GDR WAS LIVING UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS. AS A MATTER OF COURSE THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC HAD TO BE INTERRUPTED TO CHECK DOCUMENTS, BUT THE PROCEDURES UTILIZED WERE LESS TIME-CONSUMING AND COMPLICATED IN THE GDR THAN IN A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES. AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV INSISTED THAT TRANSIT WAS NOT IN ITSELF A PROBLEM, BUT THAT

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IT WAS BEING INFLATED INTO ONE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES ONLY. GOVERNING MAYOR SCHUETZ WAS A LIKEABLE MAN, BUT HE DID NOT COMMAND YEFREMOV'S RESPECT AS A POLITICIAN. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SCHUETZ THAT HE WAS OVERDOING THINGS AND WAS UNWISELY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TEMPORARY CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. A SERIOUS POLITICIAN, YEFREMOV SAID, COULD NOT LIVE FOR TODAY ALONE BUT MUST LOOK AHEAD AND SEE THE NEEDS OF THE FUTURE. YEFREMOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INSTANCE OF ACTUAL STOPPAGES ON THE AUTOBAHN RECENTLY, BUT ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH A POLICE HUNT FOR CRIMINALS--A FULLY JUSTIFIABLE ACTIVITY THAT OCCURRED EVERYWHERE.

7. REFERRING TO THE DRENKMANN ASSASSINATION, AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV SAID THAT THE GDR WOULD NEVER ALLOW A SITUATION TO DEVELOP WHERE TERROR REIGNED. WHATEVER HAD IN THE PAST BEEN SAID ABOUT THE GDR ALLOWING THE PLO TO SET UP A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN EAST BERLIN WAS NONSENSE. THE PLO OFFICE ESTABLISHED LAST YEAR IN EAST BERLIN WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO POSSESS OR TO USE WEAPONS. IT WAS THE FIXED POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR, YEFREMOV STRESSED, THAT ARMS WERE NOT TO BE USED FOR SOLVING POLITICAL ISSUES. IT WAS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO HIM THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO ENGAGED IN "BANDITRY" AGAINST PRIVATE CITIZENS AND OFFICIALS. THE SOVIET UNION RESOLUTELY CONDEMNED THIS. YEFREMOV ASSURED AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND THAT IF THE MEN INVOLVED IN THE DRENKMANN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTED TO ENTER THE GDR, THEY WOULD EITHER BE PROSECUTED LOCALLY OR TURNED OVER TO THE WESTERN AUTHORITIES.

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8. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THE DRENKMANN ASSASSINATION ESSENTIALLY FOR YEFREMOV'S INFORMATION. WITH REGARD TO THE LARGER QUESTION OF TERRORISM, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WE HAD IN THE PAST EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF A PLO OFFICE IN EAST BERLIN, AND WE THEREFORE WELCOMED AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV'S ASSURANCES THAT THE GDR WOULD TAKE WHATEVER ACTION WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT ANY ABUSE OF ITS HOSPITALITY.

9. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND AGREED WITH HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUE THAT OTHER CURRENT BERLIN ISSUES WERE ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL AND COULD BEST FOR THE PRESENT AT LEAST BE LEFT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL COUNSELLORS. HE CONCURRED IN YEFREMOV'S VIEW THAT THE QA WAS ON THE WHOLE WORKING REASONABLY WELL, AND THAT THERE WAS A DECENT RESPECT ON BOTH SIDES FOR ITS PROVISIONS. LIKE THE SOVIETS, WE WERE ALSO WATCHING

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THE SITUATION VERY CLOSELY TO ENSURE THAT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE AGREEMENT WERE RIGOROUSLY OBSERVED. OBVIOUSLY, POINTS OF DIFFERENCE WOULD ARISE FROM TIME TO TIME, BUT WE ALL WISHED TO AVOID DISPUTES. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QA HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION DURING THE SCHMIDT VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND THAT WE WOULD WELCOME FRG-SOVIET AGREEMENTS IN WHICH THE DESIDERATA OF BOTH SIDES WERE SATISFACTORILY MET.

10. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TIES BETWEEN THE FRG AND WEST BERLIN HAD IN THE PAST BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISPUTE. HE COULD ASSURE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION, NOR THAT OF OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES, TO PERMIT ANY BREACH OF THE QA AS WE INTERPRETED IT. IF DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION AROSE, THESE COULD BE DISCUSSED RATIONALLY AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND PLACE. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS THE FRG'S OBJECTIVE TO EXTEND ITS CONTROL OVER WEST BERLIN, BUT EVEN IF THIS WERE THE CASE THE SOVIETS COULD REST ASSURED THAT HE ALLIES WOULD NOT ALLOW IT TO TAKE PLACE.

11. TURNING TO LUFTHANSA LANDINGS IN WEST BERLIN, AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT WE WERE FULLY AWARE THAT GDR OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS WERE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE GDR. UNTIL SUCH TIME AS AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THIS SCORE, THESE PROJECTED LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS WOULD NOT BE A LIVE ISSUE FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE ALLIES. IF AND WHEN AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS AND THE ALLIES WOULD BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNING ENTRY INTO THE BERLIN CONTROL ZONE. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT SCHMIDT HAD PRESUMABLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW SIMPLY TO OBTAIN SOME INDICATION OF THE GENERAL SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS SECOND PART OF THE OPERATION. IF, AS NOW SEEMED TO BE THE CASE, THE FRG AND THE GDR WERE AT A STALEMATE, THERE WERE NO GROUNDS FOR

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FURTHER ALLIED-SOVIET DISCUSSION ON THE MATTER. AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV INTERJECTED THAT THE FRG AND THE GDR WERE NOT ONLY STALMATED--THEY HAD NOT EVEN BEGUN TALKING.

12. COMMENT: AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV, APPARENTLY WITH AN EYE TO THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT, SEEMED AT PAINS TO AVOID CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET POLITICAL COUNSELLOR (RODIN) HAD FOREWARNED THE MISSION THE WEEK BEFORE THAT YEFREMOV WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS THE OPERATIONS OF FEDERAL COURTS IN BERLIN, THIS TOPIC WAS NOT RAISED AT ALL. ALL OF YEFREMOV'S REMARKS WERE LOW-KEY, AND HE EXUDED A SPIRIT OF FRIENDLY COOPERATION.SELIGMANN

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